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INTRODUCTION
In each of its first six personal jurisdiction cases since 2011, the
Supreme Court systematically imposed new restrictions on personal
jurisdiction, encumbering plaintiffs in their search for justice.1 So,
in early 2021, when the Court heard its seventh case, Ford Motor
Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, it faced quite the
conundrum: the correct outcome was obvious, but it appeared foreclosed by the Court’s ever-narrowing case law.2 In two consolidated
cases, the question posed to the Court was whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Ford was appropriate in Minnesota and
Montana.3
For the uninitiated, personal jurisdiction comes in two forms:
general and specific.4 Which form of personal jurisdiction a defendant is subject to in a given state—and thus the types of claims the
defendant could face there—depends on the defendant’s contacts
with that state.5 Corporate defendants are subject to general
jurisdiction only when their contacts with the forum state are such
that they are “essentially at home” in that state6—that is, only in
their state of incorporation and the state where the corporation has
its principal place of business.7 Similarly, an individual defendant
1. See, e.g., Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Stealth Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 70
FLA. L. REV. 499, 501-03 (2018); Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Two End-of-Term Decisions Close the Courthouse Doors to Those Who Have Been Injured, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (July 6,
2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_again_closing_the_
courthouse_doors [https://perma.cc/CN66-P3G9] (“The court has again effectively closed the
courthouse door to those who have been injured.”).
2. See 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
3. Id. at 1022-24.
4. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
5. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
6. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
7. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014). The Court has “not foreclose[d]
the possibility” of “exceptional case[s]” where a corporation could be “at home” in other states.
Id. at 139 n.19 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952)). The
scholarly reaction to the Supreme Court’s introduction of the “essentially at home” standard
to govern general jurisdiction for corporate defendants in 2011 was swift and wide-ranging.
Compare, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of
the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1276 (2011) (arguing that the
“essentially at home” test “may well prove troublesome in future cases”), with Carol Andrews,
Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1082 (2012)
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is subject to general jurisdiction in her home state, that in which
she is domiciled.8 If a state can exercise general jurisdiction over a
defendant, its courts can entertain “any and all claims against
them.”9
A defendant’s contacts to the forum need not be as extensive for
a court to exercise specific jurisdiction,10 but a defendant—corporate
or individual—must still deliberately “reach out beyond [their]
state” and into the forum in some capacity.11 Even when the
nonresident defendant has reached out, the forum state may only
exercise specific jurisdiction over suits that “arise out of or relate to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”12 Courts traditionally read
this language as a unit, requiring some sort of causal link between
the defendant’s connections to the forum and the plaintiff ’s cause of
action.13
The two cases in Ford were products liability lawsuits with
similar facts. The suits arose from car accidents in Minnesota and
Montana, brought in those respective states by plaintiffs domiciled
there.14 Ford’s contacts with Minnesota and Montana were robust:
the company incessantly advertised in those states,15 sold cars to
(arguing that the “at home” standard “give[s] courts a better starting point for general
jurisdiction analysis”).
8. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924). An individual
defendant is also subject to general jurisdiction in the state where she was served process, or
“tagged.” See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619, 628 (1990).
9. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
10. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021)
(“Specific jurisdiction ... covers defendants less intimately connected with a State [than those
covered by general jurisdiction].”).
11. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985); see also Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-80).
12. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (quoting
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127).
13. See, e.g., Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Typically, courts have
read th[e] ... phrase [‘arise out of or relate to’] as a unit requiring at least a but-for causal link
between the defendant’s local activities and the plaintiff’s injuries.”); James Juo, Have You
Considered Ford Lately? How to “Relate to” Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 50 COLO. LAW., 18,
19 (“Traditionally, the phrase [‘arise out of or relate to’] ... require[d] some causal connection
to the injuries suffered.”).
14. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1023. The car involved in the Minnesota accident was a 1994
Crown Victoria, and the car involved in the Montana accident was a 1996 Explorer. Id.
15. See, e.g., id. at 1022 (“Ford engages in wide-ranging promotional activities, including
television, print, online, and direct-mail advertisements.”); Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931
N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2019) (“Ford’s advertising contacts include direct mail advertise-
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dealerships licensed to sell Fords in those states (including the same
models as those involved in the respective suits),16 and had certified
repair and replacement services in those states.17 Nonetheless,
general jurisdiction was off the table; Ford was “at home” in
Delaware and Michigan.18 The focus necessarily then turned to
specific jurisdiction. But both cars at issue were originally sold in
other states, only making their way to the fora through subsequent
consumer-to-consumer second-hand sales.19 The cars also were
neither manufactured nor designed in Minnesota or Montana.20
Ford’s connections to the states and the respective lawsuits lacked
any direct causal link.21
Thus, Ford fell into a gray area between general and specific
jurisdiction. Ford possessed an abundance of contacts with the
forum states—but not enough to render it “at home”—and those
contacts bore a resemblance to the causes of action—but held no
causal link.22 A determination that Ford would not be subject to
personal jurisdiction in these states, though, seems ridiculous. The
ments to Minnesotans and national advertising campaigns that reach the Minnesota market.
Ford’s marketing contacts include a 2016 ‘Ford Experience Tour’ in Minnesota, a 1966 Ford
Mustang built as a model car for the Minnesota Vikings, a ‘Ford Driving Skills for Life Free
National Teen Driver Training Camp’ in Minnesota, and sponsorship of multiple athletic
events in Minnesota.”).
16. See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748 (“Ford’s contacts include sales of more than 2,000
1994 Crown Victoria cars—and, more recently, about 200,000 vehicles of all kinds in 2013,
2014, and 2015—to dealerships in Minnesota.”); Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 2019 MT 115, ¶ 17, 443 P.3d 407, 414 (“Ford has thirty-six dealerships in Montana.... It
sells automobiles, specifically Ford Explorers—the kind of vehicle at issue in this case—and
parts in Montana.”).
17. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1023 (“Ford’s own network of dealers offers an array of
maintenance and repair services[.]... [Ford] provides [Montana residents] with certified repair,
replacement, and recall services.”) (internal quotations omitted); Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at
748 (“Ford has ... certified mechanics ... in Minnesota.”).
18. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022. For a discussion of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, which
seemed to advocate for a relaxation of the “at home” standard such to potentially bring
general jurisdiction over Ford back on the table under these facts, see discussion infra Part
I.B.3.
19. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1023. The Crown Victoria was originally sold in North Dakota, and
the Explorer was originally sold in Washington. Id.
20. Id. The Crown Victoria and Explorer were designed in Michigan and manufactured
in Canada and Kentucky, respectively. Id.
21. Id. at 1029 (“[The plaintiffs] did not in fact establish, or even allege, [any] causal
links.”). Justice Alito nonetheless found causation. Id. at 1033-34 (Alito, J., concurring); see
also discussion infra Part I.B.2.
22. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
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reason why courts are concerned with the quantity and quality of a
defendant’s contacts with the forum state in determining the propriety of personal jurisdiction is to ensure “that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”23 Ford’s contacts with Montana and Minnesota being
what they were, it would have been absurd to say that it was unjust
or offensive to any notion of fairness that Ford defend the suits in
those states.24 Particularly absurd because the Supreme Court assumed that personal jurisdiction was proper in this type of case all
the way back in 1980 in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,25
where it said that similarly situated global car company Audi would
be subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma under a comparable
set of facts.26
The Ford Court agreed, unanimous in its determination,27 though
split in its reasoning.28 The Ford majority bifurcated the “aris[ing]
out of or relat[ing] to” requirement, meaning that, for specific
jurisdiction to be proper, a claim could either “arise out of” or “relate
to” a defendant’s contacts with the forum state, the latter not
requiring causation.29 The majority, however, did not clearly define
23. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
24. Cf. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1032 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Can anyone seriously argue that
requiring Ford to litigate these cases in Minnesota and Montana would be fundamentally
unfair?”).
25. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
26. See id. at 297-98 (“[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as
Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other
States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum
State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over [such] a corporation.”). In World-Wide Volkswagen, similar to in Ford, a car
was purchased in one state, New York, and moved by consumers to a different state,
Oklahoma, where the plaintiffs got into an accident and subsequently brought a products
liability suit. See id. at 288.
27. The decision was 8-0; Justice Barrett took no part in the proceedings. Ford, 141 S. Ct.
at 1022, 1032.
28. In addition to the majority opinion consisting of five justices, Justices Alito and
Gorsuch authored concurrences, with Justice Thomas joining the latter. Id. at 1032-39. See
infra Part I.B for a discussion of each of the three opinions.
29. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026 (emphasis omitted) (“The first half of that standard asks
about causation; but the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some relationships will
support jurisdiction without a causal showing.”).
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a justiciable test to govern this new “relat[ing] to” specific jurisdiction,30 nor did it delineate its limits.31
This Note proposes a test to govern “relating to” specific jurisdiction, a variation on a theme to those familiar with the doctrine: a
“sliding scale” approach to contacts and relatedness, accompanied
by a separate assessment of reasonableness factors the Supreme
Court has outlined in previous cases32 to serve as a check on the
sliding scale. Part I of this Note explains the “sliding scale” approach, its unpleasant first interaction with the Court, and its
revival by the Ford majority. Part II defines this Note’s proposed
test and demonstrates its consistency with Supreme Court precedent. Finally, Part III applies this Note’s proposed approach to
hypothetical fact patterns falling within the traditional generalspecific personal jurisdiction gray area that raise questions that
could mark the next developments of “relating to” jurisdiction
doctrine.
I. THE SLIDING SCALE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COURT
Professor William M. Richman offered the sliding scale to deal
with the precise gray area question the Court faced in Ford and will
certainly face again in the future:
[W]hether jurisdiction is proper in a case that falls between
[general and specific jurisdiction,] where the defendant has

30. See id. at 1034 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (lamenting that the majority decision has left
the needed relationship between the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the cause of
action to invoke “relat[ing] to” jurisdiction “far from clear”); Patrick J. Borchers, Richard D.
Freer & Thomas C. Arthur, Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court:
Lots of Questions, Some Answers, 71 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1, 19 (2021) (“[T]he Court fails to tell
us how the assessment [between ‘arise out of’ and ‘relate to’] is made. At what point are
contacts sufficient to invoke the ‘relates to’ test?” (footnotes omitted)).
31. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1033-34 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court assures us that
‘relate to’ ... ‘incorporates real limits’ ... without any indication what those limits might be.”
(citations omitted)); id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“The majority promises that its new
test ‘does not mean anything goes,’ but that hardly tells us what does.”).
32. The Court has outlined these factors in cases like Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987), World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980), and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). For a list of these
factors and an explanation of how they will interact with the sliding scale in the context of
this Note’s proposed test, see infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
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substantial contacts with the forum, but not so many as to
justify general jurisdiction, and where the plaintiff ’s cause of
action does not arise out of the defendant’s forum activities,
although it is not totally unrelated to them.33

The approach proposes blending the requirements of general and
specific jurisdiction. General and specific jurisdiction sit at “the two
opposite ends of [the] sliding scale.”34 For cases falling between
these two ends, the scale weighs “two key variables”: the “extent of
the defendant’s forum contacts” and the “proximity of the connection between those contacts and the plaintiff ’s claim.”35 The stronger
the defendant’s contacts to the forum, the weaker the proximity
between the contacts and plaintiff ’s claim can be, until you reach
the general jurisdiction end of the scale.36 Conversely, weaker forum
contacts require a stronger connection between those contacts and
the cause of action, leading to the specific jurisdiction end of the
scale.37

33. William M. Richman, A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General
and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1337 (1984) (review essay). Because lack of
personal jurisdiction is a waivable defense, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), at least one state,
Pennsylvania, has tried to solve the traditional jurisdictional gray area problem (with respect
to corporate defendants) by requiring nonresident corporations to consent to general personal
jurisdiction in the state when registering to do business there. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. § 5301(a)(2)(i) (West 1981). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to determine
whether this practice violates due process. See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 142 S. Ct. 2646
(2022). As an aside, it is not entirely clear whether this practice is unique to Pennsylvania,
see Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 266 A.3d 542, 564 (Pa. 2021) (saying that “the precise issue
… may be peculiar to Pennsylvania” (emphasis added)), but recent scholarship on the issue
suggests that it is. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Roberts Court’s Jurisdictional
Revolution Within Ford’s Frame, 51 STETSON L. REV. 157, 168 n.71 (2022) (“[Pennsylvania’s]
registration statute is unique as the only provision in the nation that explicitly specifies
amenability to general jurisdiction is the consequence of registration.”); Tanya J. Monestier,
Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV.
1343, 1366 (2015) (“Only one state, Pennsylvania, actually purports to directly address the
jurisdictional consequences of registering to do business.”).
34. Richman, supra note 33, at 1345.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. For a visualization of Professor Richman’s sliding scale, see id. at 1341.
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A. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California: A
Bad First Impression
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California marked
the Supreme Court’s first run-in with the sliding scale.38 In that
case, the plaintiffs brought a mass tort suit in California state court
against pharmaceutical giant Bristol-Myers over personal injuries
allegedly caused by the company’s blood-thinning drug Plavix.39 Of
the 678 plaintiffs in the suit, 592 of them were not California
residents.40 With Bristol-Myers not “at home” in California,41 the
question was whether the California court could exercise specific
personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers with respect to the claims
of the non-California plaintiffs.42
Bristol-Myers’s contacts with California were unquestionably
extensive.43 The relationship between those contacts and the nonresidents’ claims, however, was not as strong. Although the
company sold Plavix in California,44 the Plavix the nonresidents
ingested was not sold in California, nor was it manufactured, developed, labeled, or packaged there.45 The nonresidents also did not
obtain Plavix via any California doctor or source, nor did they suffer
or get treated for any injuries from the drug in California.46 Like in
Ford, there was no causal link.47
The California Supreme Court, using a version of the sliding
scale, found there was personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers as
to the nonresident claims.48 Given the wide-ranging nature of
38. See 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
39. See id. at 1778.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 1778, 1780. Bristol-Myers is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal
place of business in New York. Id. at 1777.
42. See id. at 1779.
43. Id. at 1778. The company had five of its research facilities in California (employing
around 160 employees), and between 2006 and 2012, the company sold 187 million pills of
Plavix in California, raking in over $900 million (accounting for just over 1 percent of the
company’s nationwide sales revenue). Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of a causal link in
Ford); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional reading of
“arise out of or relate to” as requiring some sort of causal link for specific jurisdiction to lie).
48. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778-79.
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Bristol-Myers’s contacts with the forum,49 the California court said
it could exercise specific jurisdiction “based on a less direct connection between [Bristol-Myers]’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims
than might otherwise be required.”50 The court concluded that the
nonresident claims showed a sufficient connection to Bristol-Myers’s
forum contacts because those claims were borne out of the same allegedly defective product and misleading marketing of that product
that gave rise to the California plaintiffs’ claims (over which specific
jurisdiction was uncontroverted).51 The court also cited the company’s research and development activity for other drugs in the
forum.52
1. Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court overturned the decision in an
opinion authored by Justice Alito.53 He said the California Supreme
Court’s use of the sliding scale was “difficult to square with [the U.S.
Supreme Court’s] precedents” and that it “resemble[d] a loose and
spurious form of general jurisdiction.”54 According to Justice Alito,
the “danger” of the sliding scale—as used by the California Supreme
Court—was that it allowed a finding that specific jurisdiction was
present “without identifying any adequate link between the State
and the nonresidents’ claims.”55 “What [was] needed—and what
[was] missing [in the case],” he explained, “[was] a connection
between the forum and the specific claims at issue.”56 Because of
that, the nonresident claims did not “arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum,” and thus the California
Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that personal jurisdiction
existed.57 However, despite his strong language against the sliding
scale—strong to the point some read the opinion as marking the
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
50. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 377 P.3d 874, 889 (Cal. 2016).
51. See id. at 888.
52. Id. at 889.
53. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777.
54. Id. at 1781.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1780-84 (alterations omitted) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014)).
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sliding scale’s demise58—Justice Alito “[did] not identify the precise
adverse consequences of the sliding-scale approach.”59
To be sure, the decision did not solely emanate from any specific
disdain toward the sliding scale; there were other considerations
doing work under the hood. After discussing the necessary analysis
of the quantity and quality of a defendant’s contacts in the personal
jurisdiction puzzle, Justice Alito discussed the “variety of interests”
a court must consider in determining whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction, identifying “the burden on the defendant” as “the
primary concern.”60 This burden not only includes the practical
concerns of having to litigate in the forum, but notably, “it also encompasses the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive
power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the
claims in question.”61 Justice Alito did not elucidate further as to
what role this played in deciding the case,62 but it is not difficult to
see why the majority would think California had “little legitimate
interest”63 in adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims: (1) they
were nonresidents, so California had no inherent interest in providing them compensation; (2) all the nonresidents suffered and
were treated for their injuries in other states, so California had no
compensation interest in the form of providing remedy for any
injuries within its borders; and (3) all the nonresidents ingested the
medicine in other states, so there was no conduct by any of those
plaintiffs that California would have an interest in regulating.64 In
her dissent, Justice Sotomayor called this worry that California was
58. See Rhodes, supra note 33, at 180 n.153 (describing Bristol-Myers as “rejecting the
possibility of a sliding scale between general and specific jurisdiction”); Alexandra Wilson
Albright, Personal Jurisdiction, 30 APP. ADVOC. 9, 32 (2017) (“The United States Supreme
Court [in Bristol-Meyers] clearly rejected the sliding scale standard.”); see also Levi M.
Klinger-Christiansen, Comment, The Nexus Requirement After Bristol-Myers: Does “Arise Out
of or Relate to” Require Causation?, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1145, 1169 (2020) (“[Justice
Alito’s] opinion clearly did not look favorably on the [sliding scale] approach and certainly
invalidated its use in a non-causal context.”).
59. Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 519.
60. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
61. Id.
62. See Hoffheimer, supra note 1, at 518.
63. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
64. See id. at 1778; infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (cataloguing the potential
“significant interests at stake” for forum states exercising personal jurisdiction and explaining what facts implicate those interests).
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seeking to exercise jurisdiction over claims it had no manifest
interest in adjudicating—as opposed to any contempt toward the
sliding scale—the “animating concern” behind the majority’s decision.65
2. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
Justice Sotomayor alone would have upheld the California
Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.66 After addressing BristolMyers’s abundant contacts with California, she turned to relatedness.67 Rather than require those claims to “arise out of or relate to”
Bristol-Myers’s forum contacts (like the majority), she said the
nonresident’s claims need only “relate to” those contacts for specific
jurisdiction to be invoked.68 The nonresident plaintiff ’s claims
“concern[ed] conduct materially identical to acts the company took
in California.”69 Justice Sotomayor said the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence “require[d] no connection more direct than
that.”70
Justice Sotomayor then turned to the reasonableness of jurisdiction.71 She explained that the defendant would not be burdened by
having to defend the nonresident claims in California because it
already had to litigate identical claims from the California plaintiffs.72 She also noted the plaintiffs’ “interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief” would be furthered by allowing the consolidation of these claims to minimize court costs.73 Finally, Justice
Sotomayor presented the two reasons why she thought California
was interested in providing a forum for the nonresidents’ claims:
joining the nonresidents to the lawsuit would vindicate California’s
purported interests in (1) “facilitat[ing] the efficient adjudication
65. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1789.
67. Id. at 1786.
68. Id. (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984)). Justice Sotomayor defined “relat[ing] to” as “ha[ving] a ‘connection with.’” Id. (quoting
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1786-87.
72. Id. at 1786.
73. Id. at 1786-87 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
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of the residents’ claims” and (2) “allow[ing] [California] to regulate
more effectively the conduct of ... nonresident corporations like
Bristol-Myers.”74
Although this Note disagrees with Justice Sotomayor’s conclusion
that California was interested in adjudicating these claims,75 her
analytical framework was the right one: first, determine the quantity of the defendant’s forum contacts; second, analyze relatedness;
and third, assess reasonableness.76 This Note’s proposed standard
employs the same structure.77
Justice Sotomayor was also right that the majority’s decision
turned on considerations of reasonableness—that jurisdiction would
be unreasonable because California was not interested in providing
a forum for the nonresident claims—rather than relatedness.78 This
vindication comes from the Ford Court, which distinguished Ford
from this case solely based on facts showing jurisdiction was
reasonable because the forum states in Ford were interested in
adjudicating the cases, whereas California, in this case, was not.79
B. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court:
The Sliding Scale’s Tacit Revival
Although the Ford Court never directly mentioned the sliding
scale,80 this Note refers to Bristol-Myers as the Court’s “first”
encounter with the sliding scale (as opposed to its only encounter
with it) because the Ford decision clearly marks a “de facto adoption
of the sliding scale approach.”81 Because of “the reach of Ford’s
Montana and Minnesota contacts,”82 the majority lowered the
requisite relatedness to find specific jurisdiction from causation to
74. Id. at 1787. But see infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (explaining why the
interests Justice Sotomayor suggests cannot be considered valid forum state interests
attributable to California).
75. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
76. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784-87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
77. See infra Part II.A.
78. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1788 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (calling this “[t]he
majority’s animating concern”); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
79. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1031 (2021); see
also infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
80. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022-32.
81. Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 13.
82. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1029.
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a non-causal “relationship” or “connection.”83 Justices Alito and
Gorsuch, both concurring in the judgment, would each have preferred different solutions than a sliding scale,84 but this Note posits
that their respective alternatives may not entirely solve their
respective doctrinal gripes with the majority’s approach.85
1. Majority Opinion
Justice Kagan authored the majority opinion and concluded that
Ford was subject to specific jurisdiction in the forum states.86 After
running through Ford’s “veritable truckload of contacts with
Montana and Minnesota,” the discussion turned to what the requisite relationship between those contacts and the plaintiffs’ claims
should be for personal jurisdiction over Ford to be proper.87 Here,
the majority split the “arise out of or relate to” requirement88 and
did away with requiring a causal link in specific jurisdiction cases.89
As the majority put it, “[t]he first half of that standard asks about
causation; but the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some
relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.”90
The majority concluded that Ford’s forum contacts—its ads,
licensed dealerships, the sales of Ford vehicles, and its certified
repair and replacement services—sufficiently “related to” the plaintiffs’ claims.91 According to the majority, what “underscore[d] the
aptness of finding jurisdiction”—that is, what justified demanding
only that the plaintiffs’ claims “relate to” Ford’s forum contacts—
was “the reach of Ford’s Montana and Minnesota contacts.”92 In
other words, the majority did precisely what the sliding scale
83. Id. at 1032.
84. See id. at 1032-39.
85. See discussion infra Part I.B.2-3.
86. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1022, 1032.
87. Id. at 1023-24, 1031.
88. Id. at 1026. Justice Brennan was the first on the Court to argue the “arise out of or
relate to” requirement be split. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 425 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026 (“[A] causation-only approach finds no support in this
Court’s requirement of a ‘connection’ between a plaintiff’s suit and a defendant’s activities.”
(quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1776 (2017))).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1026-29.
92. Id. at 1029.
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proposes: it inversely shifted the threshold requirement for the
relationship between the plaintiff ’s claims and the defendant’s
contacts with the forum in response to the extent of those contacts.93
The majority lowered the relatedness necessary because Ford’s
contacts in the fora were so great.94 In so doing, the majority
breathed life back into the sliding scale that the Court had just
“pilloried” in Bristol-Myers.95
It should also be noted that while its desertion of the causation
requirement grabbed the headlines,96 equally as important to the
majority’s decision was the reasonableness of jurisdiction. Rather
than analyze reasonableness as a separate piece of the puzzle, the
majority sprinkled its reasonableness discussion throughout its
relatedness inquiry.97 But this did not make the message that
jurisdiction was reasonable any less clear: the burden on Ford
having to litigate the cases in the forum states was negligible, and
Montana and Minnesota were interested in adjudicating these
cases.98 With respect to Ford’s burden, the Court concluded that
because Ford “conduct[s] so much business in Montana and Minnesota,”99 that burden “can hardly be said to be undue.”100

93. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (describing the sliding scale).
94. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028-29; Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 15 (“The [Ford]
majority ... appeared to adopt a sliding scale; the greater the volume of contacts, the more
likely they are related to the claim.”).
95. Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 7-8 (“[The Ford Court] inevitably rekindled
discussion of a sliding-scale analysis, although it probably will not be called that after the
term was pilloried in [Bristol-Myers].” (footnote omitted)); see also Richard D. Freer, From
Contacts to Relatedness: Invigorating the Promise of “Fair Play and Substantial Justice” in
Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine, 73 ALA. L. REV. 583, 600 (2022) (“[T]he [Ford] Court appears
to recognize a sliding scale (though it will never call it that, given the rejection of the term in
Bristol-Myers).”).
96. See, e.g., Zachary Tripp, Pravin R. Patel, Brian Liegel & Elaina Aquila, Supreme Court
Holds that “But-For” Causation Is Not Required for Specific Jurisdiction, AM. BAR.ASS’N. (Apr.
8, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2021/04/but-forcausation/ [https://perma.cc/BF5U-GYSY]; The Supreme Court Rejects “Causation-Only” Test
for Specific Jurisdiction, CROWELL (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/
AlertsNewsletters/all/The-Supreme-Court-Rejects-Causation-Only-Test-for-Specific-Juris
diction [https://perma.cc/25X8-WQR8].
97. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026-30.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 1029.
100. Id. at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
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Doctrinally significant, the facts implicating Montana and
Minnesota’s interests are what distinguish this case from BristolMyers. Ford argued that the Bristol-Myers decision foreclosed the
possibility of personal jurisdiction in the case, but the Ford majority
explained why it did not: “[T]he [Ford] plaintiffs [we]re residents of
the forum States. They used the allegedly defective products in the
forum States. And they suffered injuries when those products
malfunctioned in the forum States.”101 These facts illustrate the
“significant interests at stake” for Montana and Minnesota: compensation of their residents, ensuring dangerous defective machinery
is not being driven on their roads, and providing recompense for
injuries suffered within their borders.102 Accordingly, the “exercise
of jurisdiction is so reasonable” in Ford.103
A quick pit stop is necessary to make a broader doctrinal point.
Although the Ford majority intertwined its reasonableness and relatedness analyses,104 it makes more sense to conceptualize forum
state interests—and thus the distinction between Ford and BristolMyers—solely as a matter of reasonableness. Whether a state is
interested in adjudicating a case has no direct bearing on whether
a defendant’s contacts with that state are related to a given cause
of action. A state may very well be interested in providing a forum
in a case where, for example, one of its residents leaves the state
and suffers injury at the hands of a defendant who has no connection whatsoever to that state. The fact that the state is interested in
having that case litigated in its courts makes no difference—or, at
least, should make no difference—as to whether those claims bear
any relationship to that defendant’s contacts to that state (which, in
this example, happen to be nonexistent). With that, we return to
Ford.
The overriding assurance the Ford majority made is that its creation of “relating to” specific jurisdiction “does not mean anything
goes.”105 This new noncausal specific jurisdiction “incorporates real
limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a
101. Id. at 1031.
102. Id. at 1030.
103. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 1029 (“[A]llowing jurisdiction in these cases treats
Ford fairly.”).
104. See id. at 1026-30.
105. Id. at 1026.
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forum.”106 However, as Justices Alito and Gorsuch correctly pointed
out in their respective concurrences, the majority did not make clear
what those “real limits” entail.107
2. Justice Alito’s Concurrence
Justice Alito agreed that specific jurisdiction over Ford existed
but disagreed with the majority’s bifurcation of the “arise out of or
relate to” requirement,108 disapproving of their “pars[ing of] th[e]
phrase as though [they] were dealing with language of a statute.”109
His chief concern was that the majority announced limits to its new
“relating to” jurisdiction without actually identifying what those
limits were.110
Justice Alito said that Ford “c[ould] and should [have] be[en]
decided without any alteration or refinement” of the Court’s jurisprudence.111 However, notwithstanding the veracity of this statement, scholars were quick to note that Justice Alito’s solution did
not come without doctrinal “alteration” and “refinement” of its
own.112
Justice Alito argued the Court should have retained a causation
requirement.113 And to satisfy that requirement he wished to preserve, Justice Alito found a causal link between the suits and Ford’s
forum activities, but only a “rough causal connection,”114 one that
was “causal in a broad sense of the concept.”115 He said that it was
“reasonable to infer” that the cars in question would not have been

106. Id.
107. See id. at 1033-34 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1035 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[Splitting the ‘arise out of or relate to’
requirement] is unnecessary and, in my view, unwise.... Recognizing ‘relate to’ as an
independent basis for specific jurisdiction risks needless complications.”).
109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
341 (1979)).
110. See id. at 1033-34 (“[T]he Court assures us that ‘relate to’ ... ‘incorporates real limits’
... without any indication what those limits might be.”).
111. Id. at 1032.
112. See Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 13 (“Justice Alito’s causation requirement is just
as much a ‘refinement’ of the case law as the majority’s splitting of the ‘arise out of or relate
to’ phrase.”).
113. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1033-34 (Alito, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 1034.
115. Id. at 1033.
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on the roads in Minnesota and Montana had Ford been an unknown
brand that had no contacts with the fora and that the purpose of
Ford’s forum contacts was to put more Fords on the roads there.116
It is difficult to argue with this conclusion, but a standard forged by
“broad[ening the] sense of the concept”117 of causation could just as
quickly devolve into no standard at all. After all, at a certain level
of generality, a limitless number of events can be said to bear a
“rough causal connection”118 to another.119 Although Justice Alito is
correct that the majority’s approach lacks clear limits (and this Note
accordingly proposes a test with limits), his approach may not solve
that problem.
3. Justice Gorsuch’s Concurrence
Justice Gorsuch, similar to Justice Alito, criticized the majority’s splitting of the “arising out of or relating to” requirement.120
Specifically, he took issue with the majority’s characterization of the
requisite relatedness between Ford’s forum contacts and the plaintiffs’ claims as a “relationship,” “affiliation,” and “connection.”121
Justice Gorsuch complained this “assortment of nouns” leaves the
necessary relatedness to confer “relating to” jurisdiction “far from
clear.”122
Rather than solve the traditional jurisdictional gray-area problem
by extending specific jurisdiction past the causal barrier as the majority did, it seems Justice Gorsuch would instead argue to extend
general jurisdiction by relaxing the “at home” standard for general
jurisdiction over corporations.123 But if the argument against the
majority’s new “relating to” jurisdiction is that there is a lack of
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 1034. Justice Alito argued that requiring a “sort of rough causal connection”
would “limit[ ] the potentially boundless reach of ‘relat[ing] to’” jurisdiction. Id.
119. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“As every first year law student learns, a but-for
causation test isn’t the most demanding. At a high level of abstraction, one might say any
event in the world would not have happened ‘but for’ events far and long removed.”).
120. Id. at 1034-36.
121. Id. at 1034.
122. Id. at 1034-35.
123. See id. at 1034 (“If it made sense to speak of a corporation having one or two ‘homes’
in 1945, it seems almost quaint in 2021 when corporations with global reach often have
massive operations spread across multiple States.”).
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clarity,124 it should be noted that the more relaxed, pre-“at home”
standard for general jurisdiction over corporations—the “continuous
and systematic” contacts test—was itself notoriously unclear.125 Also
unclear is why any solution to the jurisdictional gray-area problem
should be solely limited to suits involving corporate defendants,
even if cases falling into the gray area involving individual defendants are less common.
II. DEFINING THE REVIVED SLIDING SCALE’S “REAL LIMITS” TO
SQUARE IT WITH COURT PRECEDENT
First, the Ford decision necessitates a slight semantic tweak of
the traditional sliding scale. General jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction marked the two opposite ends of Professor Richman’s sliding
scale,126 but because the Ford Court held Ford was subject to specific
jurisdiction in Montana and Minnesota in a case falling within
those two opposite ends,127 this can no longer be the case. Rather,
the ends of the sliding scale must now be general jurisdiction at one
extreme and specifically causal “arising out of” specific jurisdiction
at the other, with the noncausal “relating to” specific jurisdiction
making up the space in between.
With that linguistic edit in mind, this Section fleshes out this
Note’s proposed sliding scale-plus-reasonableness factors approach
to govern “relating to” jurisdiction. Section II.A first sets forth the
reasonableness factors courts would consider. Then, Section II.A
shows how those factors fit into the proposed approach by arranging the approach’s methodological steps and explaining how the
124. See id. at 1034-35 (“[T]he majority’s new test risk[s] adding new layers of confusion
to our personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.”).
125. See, e.g., Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 16 (“[T]he pre-Goodyear tests for ‘continuous
and systematic’ contacts, which [Justice Gorsuch’s desired] search for additional corporate
homes would likely resemble, were also unclear.”); Andrews, supra note 7, at 1001 (“[C]ourts
and commentators for decades labored to apply [the] vague ‘continuous and systematic’
standard.”); PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & CHRISTOPHER A.
WHYTOCK, CONFLICT OF LAWS 381-82 (6th ed. 2018) (“[The ‘continuous and systematic’
standard] left open important questions. One obvious one [wa]s the definition of those terms.
The words themselves ... d[id] not lend themselves to any bright-line test.... Unfortunately,
as one might expect with a lack of clear ... Supreme Court guidance, conflicting authorities
abounded[, and] lower courts [were] left at sea.”).
126. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
127. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1032.
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sliding scale inquiry and the reasonableness factors interact
(including how the factors can limit “relating to” jurisdiction).
Finally, Section II.A presents practical and doctrinal rationales for
the proposed setup. Sections II.B and II.C apply the proposed
approach to Bristol-Myers and Ford, respectively, and display the
approach’s consistency with both decisions.
A. Recommending the Reasonableness Factors as the Revived
Scale’s “Real Limits,” with Rationales
Regarding what the “real limits” of “relating to” jurisdiction
should be, this Note proposes that the Court employ reasonableness
factors it has outlined in prior personal jurisdiction cases. A court
should consider: (1) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
case,128 (2) the burden on the defendant to litigate in the forum,129
(3) the burden on the plaintiff to go to the defendant’s home or a
more obvious state to litigate,130 (4) the location of the crucial
evidence and witnesses,131 and (5) “the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”132
These factors should be a separate element of “relating to”
jurisdiction, enlisted only after first analyzing the two variables of
the sliding scale. Thus, the running order for courts in evaluating
whether “relating to” jurisdiction exists would be as follows:
(1) identify the defendant’s forum contacts to determine how close
a relationship between those contacts and the plaintiff ’s claim the
128. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(plurality opinion); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 (1957).
129. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 (plurality opinion); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477;
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
130. See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. at 223 (outlining the query as being whether it would
“severe[ly] disadvantage” the plaintiff by requiring travel to “a distant State” or if they “could
not afford the cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum”); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 292 (characterizing this factor as “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief”).
131. See, e.g., McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
132. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
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sliding scale demands; (2) appraise the relationship between those
contacts and the plaintiff ’s claim to determine if it meets the
requisite relatedness to satisfy the sliding scale theory; then, if the
sliding scale theory was satisfied, or it was a close case, (3) assess
reasonableness. If, after step two, a court determined the sliding
scale theory was clearly not satisfied, then there would be no need
to proceed to step three: the case would be over—there would be no
“relating to” jurisdiction.133
There are three canons to outline the authority this Note gives
(and does not give) the reasonableness factors within its proposed
test, all consistent with how the Supreme Court has utilized reasonableness formulations in “arising out of” jurisdiction cases past.
First (and hinted at in the preceding paragraph), the reasonableness
factors cannot on their own create jurisdiction in a case where the
defendant’s contacts with the forum are not of sufficient quantity
and quality to fall within the province of the sliding scale.134 Second,
when a court is on the fence as to whether a case falls within the
sliding scale’s ambit, the reasonableness factors may tip the scale
in either direction.135 Finally, even when it is obvious that the
requirements of the sliding scale are satisfied, the reasonableness
factors, if they reveal that jurisdiction would be so unreasonable,
can defeat jurisdiction on their own.136
Explicitly adopting the reasonableness factors in this way serves
three important goals. The first is administrability. The Court is

133. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining that the reasonableness factors
do not have the power to create “relating to” jurisdiction by themselves in a case that fails the
sliding scale inquiry).
134. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (“Even if the defendant would suffer
minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another
State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy;
even if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment.”); supra note 133 and accompanying text.
135. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (“[Reasonableness] considerations sometimes serve
to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts
than would otherwise be required.”).
136. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987)
(plurality opinion); id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(explaining that considerations of reasonableness may defeat jurisdiction if they show that
the forum’s exercise of jurisdiction would skirt the “minimum requirements inherent in the
concept of fair play and substantial justice” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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concerned with the justiciability of its tests at the lower levels.137
Cogently spelling out the steps and factors a lower court is to follow
in determining whether they can exercise “relating to” jurisdiction
will undoubtedly make those courts’ jobs easier. The Ford majority’s
failure to clearly demonstrate the steps courts should take in this
respect did not go unnoticed by scholars.138 Adopting the reasonableness factors also makes clear two doctrinal details the Ford Court
left very much in flux: (1) precisely how the reasonableness of “relating to” jurisdiction is to be assessed and (2) that these factors are
a separate element of “relating to” jurisdiction.139 In essence, this
Note’s approach forges a workable sliding scale while saving a place
for the reasonableness factors more generally.
Second, employing the reasonableness factors as a check on the
sliding scale quells concerns that have kept courts from adopting
the sliding scale approach in the past. One of the arguments140
against the “melt[ing] together” of general jurisdiction and (causal)
specific jurisdiction that the sliding scale proposes is that it would
“severely weaken[ ] the defendant’s ability to anticipate the jurisdictional consequences of its conduct.”141 Because the sliding scale
“considers all of a defendant’s contacts with a forum in determining
the appropriate level of relatedness that must exist between a claim
and a defendant’s contacts,” the argument goes, a defendant with
abundant contacts with a forum “would have to compensate ... by
giving up some of its ability to predict what types of claims it may
be sued for in the forum.”142 Thus, the traditional sliding scale risks

137. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1034 (2021)
(Alito, J., concurring) (“doubt[ing] that the lower courts will find” the majority opinion
“terribly helpful” in determining whether they can exercise “relating to” jurisdiction over a
defendant).
138. See Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 20 (calling the “[m]ost frustrating” part of the
Ford majority opinion its “lack of attention to methodology”).
139. See Freer, supra note 95, at 603; Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 20-21.
140. For this argument in full, see Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two
Profiles for Specific Jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV. 343, 366 (2005).
141. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 583 (Tex. 2007) (quoting
Simard, supra note 140, at 366); see also Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514
F.3d 1063, 1078-79 (10th Cir. 2008) (“By eliminating the distinction between contacts that are
sufficient to support any suit and those that require the suit be related to the contact, it also
undermines the rationale for the relatedness inquiry: to allow a defendant to anticipate his
jurisdictional exposure based on his own actions.” (citing Simard, supra note 140, at 366)).
142. Simard, supra note 140, at 366.
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undermining the “underlying rationale[s]” of general and specific
jurisdiction, which are “predicated largely upon the concept of
expectation.”143
However, because the reasonableness factors can deprive a court
of jurisdiction on their own under this Note’s proposed approach, a
defendant knows the inquiry into whether it can be haled into a
state’s courts under a “relating to” jurisdiction theory does not end
with the determination that the sliding scale theory is satisfied.144
A court would also analyze reasonableness, looking at, among other
things, whether the defendant’s conduct’s effects give rise to a forum
state interest and the location of the witnesses and evidence that
can attest to the effects of that conduct.145 The Ford majority specifically discussed the direct correlation between reasonableness
and predictability; where jurisdiction is reasonable, it is also predictable.146 So, the reasonableness factors, as the sliding scale’s “real
limits,” operate as an extra—and constitutionally adequate—layer
of protection for defendants’ jurisdictional expectations. Put another way, by allowing a defendant to anticipate the jurisdictional
consequences of its conduct through the lens of both (1) the sliding
scale theory and (2) the reasonableness factors, this Note’s proposed
test sufficiently “allows [a defendant] to ‘structure [its] primary
conduct’ to lessen or even avoid the costs of state-court litigation.”147
Finally, and most importantly, adopting the reasonableness
factors in this capacity creates a test for assessing “relating to”
jurisdiction that produces results consistent with the Court’s
decisions in Bristol-Myers and Ford. Consider the following illustrations.
B. Applying the Revived Sliding Scale to Bristol-Myers
First up: applying this Note’s sliding scale-plus-reasonableness
factors approach to the facts of Bristol-Myers. The prefatory finding
is that there is no causal link between Bristol-Myers’s forum
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
146. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1030 (2021)
(“Precisely because th[e] exercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable, it is also predictable.”).
147. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
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contacts and the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims.148 This precludes any
“arising out of” discussion and brings the case into the realm of
“relating to.” The next step is to run through the sliding scale’s two
inquiries—the breadth of forum contacts and the relationship
between those contacts and the claims at issue. With respect to the
first question, as both the U.S. and California Supreme Courts
concluded, Bristol-Myers’s contacts with the forum were extraordinarily strong.149 This conclusion—based on the company’s five
research facilities in the forum and its drug sales in the state
exceeding $900 million in revenue from 2006 to 2012150—slides the
case extremely close to the “general jurisdiction” end of the scale,
immensely lowering the requisite relatedness between those contacts and the nonresident claims needed to find jurisdiction.
With respect to relatedness, Bristol-Myers’s conduct in California
certainly “relates to” the nonresident claims, albeit somewhat tenuously. Bristol-Myers’s forum contacts mirror its conduct in other
states the claims causally “arose out of.” The company engaged in
the exact same conduct—marketing, shipping, and selling Plavix to
customers—in California that it did in the other states.151 Although,
to be sure, this relationship could be stronger, it is nevertheless
sufficient to clear the low relatedness bar set by the breadth of
Bristol-Myers’s forum contacts. The sliding scale theory is satisfied
here.
From there, the analysis turns to the reasonableness factors. The
first factor, whether the forum state has an interest in adjudicating
this case, was discussed above in Part I.A.1.152 To recap, California
clearly had no valid interest here. The plaintiffs at issue were nonCalifornians who suffered all their injuries outside of California;153
California’s compensation interest was thus implicated neither on
the basis of plaintiff state citizenship nor on the state’s desire to
recompense any injuries felt within its borders.154 Further, none of
the plaintiffs ingested Plavix in California,155 so California’s
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778-80 (2017).
See id. at 1777-78.
Id. at 1778; supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
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regulatory interest in ensuring that dangerous defective medicine
was not being used within its borders also failed to materialize.156
Justice Sotomayor’s two arguments for why California was
interested in adjudicating the nonresident claims157 are both
untenable. With respect to her first argument—her appeal to
California’s purported interest in “facilitat[ing] the efficient
adjudication of the residents’ claims”158—recall that the “interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies” is not an
interest of any one state; rather, it is the interest of “the interstate
judicial system” as a whole.159 “[T]he interstate judicial system’s
interest”160 is its own reasonableness factor, distinct from the forum
state’s interest in adjudicating the suit at hand.161 So her first
argument falls. This Note must also reject Justice Sotomayor’s
second argument—that California has a valid interest in “allow[ing]
[itself] to regulate more effectively the conduct of ... nonresident
corporations like Bristol-Myers”162—because this will always be the
case. The logic is cyclical: a forum state will always be able to
“regulate more effectively the conduct of”163 any defendant if it can
exercise personal jurisdiction over them. This cannot then operate
as a basis for supporting a finding of jurisdiction. If every single case
has, in effect, an already-built-in valid state interest, the reasonableness factors will not be able to “adequately protect defendants
foreign to a forum.”164
If the reasonableness factors are to have any bite, valid state interests cannot be nebulous. A court’s state-interest inquiry should
accordingly home in on the three valid, concrete interests the Ford
majority identified.165 Because none of those interests are implicated
156. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
157. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)) .
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
162. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021).
165. A court should ask: (1) Is the plaintiff a resident of the forum State, meaning the
forum State has a compensation interest? (2) Was the plaintiff injured in the forum State,
giving rise to a compensation interest? (3) Did the plaintiff use the allegedly defective product
in the forum State (or something analogous, if a different type of case), meaning the forum has
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here, California has no valid interest in adjudicating this case. This
heavily weighs against jurisdiction.
The second factor—the burden on the defendant litigating in the
forum—weighs in favor of finding jurisdiction. Bristol-Myers Squibb
is a pharmaceutical behemoth;166 it would face no real practical
burden litigating in California, to say nothing of the fact that it was
already in California litigating the resident claims.
The third factor—the burden on the plaintiffs to go to the
defendant’s home or a more obvious state to litigate—does not tell
us much. To be sure, the most obvious and convenient states for
these plaintiffs to bring their respective claims would be their respective home states. For some of these nonresident plaintiffs
(certainly those living east of the Mississippi), litigating in the
states where Bristol-Myers is “at home”—Delaware or New
York167—very well may also be less burdensome since those states
are closer to them than is California. This factor, however, is also
impacted by the fact that this was a mass tort suit. For some of
these plaintiffs, litigating in California would have been more
convenient (notwithstanding geographical considerations) because
they could have pooled funds and spent less money litigating the
case. In short, this factor is a wash.
The fourth factor—the location of witnesses and evidence—clearly
counsels against jurisdiction. The crucial witnesses and evidence
here were those that could testify to the status of the allegedly
defective medicine and the injuries the plaintiffs suffered. These
witnesses and pieces of evidence would be in the states where the
plaintiffs received and ingested the medicine, which in the case of
every single nonresident plaintiff was not California.168
The fifth factor is something of a catch-all that will not always
play a substantial role, but it does here. There are very real
concerns that the nonresident plaintiffs were forum shopping in this
case, trying to sue in California as they viewed it as plaintiff-

a regulatory interest? See id. at 1030-31; supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. The
exhaustivity of this list will, one would imagine, be the subject of future litigation.
166. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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friendly.169 It is undoubtedly in “the shared interest of the several
States” to prevent litigants from forum shopping, “furthering [the]
fundamental substantive social polic[y]”170 of encouraging fair
litigation practices. And although it could be said that consolidating
the nonresident and resident claims into one suit would further “the
interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies,”171 the very palpable, very serious unease over forum shopping here completely overpowers and nullifies
that point. This factor thus weighs against the nonresident plaintiffs as well.
Here, three of the reasonableness factors entirely weigh against
jurisdiction, and only one weighs in favor. Yes, the defendant would
not have faced any practical burden to defend the suit in the forum,
but the forum state had no interest in adjudicating the suit, the
crucial witnesses and evidence were all elsewhere, and the plaintiffs
appeared to be forum shopping.172 The reasonableness factors weigh
so heavily against jurisdiction here that it shows California
exercising jurisdiction would violate the “minimum requirements
inherent in the concept of fair play and substantial justice.”173 As
such, this is a case where the reasonableness factors defeat “relating
to” jurisdiction even though the sliding scale theory is satisfied.174
169. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1031 (“[T]he [nonresident] plaintiffs [in Bristol-Myers] were
engaged in forum-shopping—suing in California because it was thought plaintiff-friendly,
even though their cases had no tie to the State.”).
170. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
171. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292); see also Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1787 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing, in effect,
this point, although incorrectly attributing this interest to California).
172. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781-83.
173. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (internal quotation marks omitted)).
174. See supra note 136 and accompanying text; cf. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105, 113-16 (plurality
opinion); id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In Asahi,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Asahi, a Japanese company, because after “[c]onsidering the international
context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and
the forum State,” the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “the exercise of personal jurisdiction
by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and unfair.” Id. at 116
(plurality opinion); see also id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“This is one of those rare cases in which ‘minimum requirements inherent in the
concept of “fair play and substantial justice”’ ... defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even
[though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.” (quoting Burger King,
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The factors limit the exercise of “relating to” jurisdiction, and this
Note’s approach generates the same result the Court reached in
Bristol-Myers.
And beyond the same result, their rationales are reconcilable too.
Once Bristol-Myers is understood as turning on considerations of
reasonableness, it is very easy to recognize Justice Alito’s vague
appeal to there being no “connection” or “adequate link” between the
claims and the forum (which may originally have been seen as a
paean to relatedness) as based on reasonableness considerations as
well.175 The missing “adequate link” was a fact that would have
given rise to a state interest: the harm occurring in California, the
plaintiffs being California residents, or the plaintiffs ingesting the
medicine in California.176 If California had clearly been the most
natural state to bring the suit or if there were witnesses and
evidence to testify to the merits of the case in California, there likely
would have been a sufficient “connection between the forum and the
specific claims at issue.”177
C. Applying the Revived Sliding Scale to Ford
Because there is no causal link between Ford’s contacts and the
claims (nor any such allegation from the plaintiffs),178 the only valid
theory for specific jurisdiction is “relating to” jurisdiction. Enter the
sliding scale. Like Bristol-Myers, and as discussed above, Ford’s
forum contacts were vast.179 Again, this case sits near the “general
jurisdiction” end of the scale; the necessary relatedness between
Ford’s forum contacts and the claims is thus very low.180
Continuing the similarities with Bristol-Myers,181 Ford had forum
contacts mirroring contacts it had in other states, and those contacts
471 U.S. at 477-78)).
175. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781; supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
176. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781-82; see supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text
(identifying facts that implicate valid forum state interests).
177. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
178. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1029 (2021) (“The
plaintiffs here did not in fact establish, or even allege, [any] causal links.”).
179. See id. at 1031 (“Ford has a veritable truckload of contacts with Montana and
Minnesota, as it admits.”); Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777-78; supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
180. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
181. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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in those other states furnished links in the respective chains leading
to the plaintiffs’ injuries.182 Ford sold the exact same models of cars
in the forum states as it did in the other states which eventually
made their way to the plaintiffs and allegedly caused their
injuries.183 These parallel contacts clearly “relate to” the claims,
although similarly tenuously to how the parallel contacts did in
Bristol-Myers.184
Also “related to” the plaintiffs’ claims were Ford’s advertising and
certified repair services in the forum states. The purpose of these
contacts in the forum states was to encourage the residents of those
states to become Ford drivers,185 and Ford succeeded in this with
respect to the plaintiffs.186 And although the plaintiffs did not allege
that their purchases of the cars—and, by extension, their injuries—causally “arose out of” Ford’s advertising, six of the Justices
explicitly noted that ads in a given state could be the reason why a
resident of that state chooses to buy a Ford, whether that purchase
be from a dealership or second-hand.187 Ford’s forum contacts

182. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (describing the parallel contacts in BristolMyers).
185. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (“[B]y making it easier to own a Ford, [Ford] encourage[s]
Montanans and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.”); id. at 1033 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“The whole point of [Ford’s forum] activities was to put more Fords (including
those in question here) on Minnesota and Montana roads.”).
186. See id. at 1023 (majority opinion).
187. The six Justices were the five in the majority plus Justice Alito. See id. at 1022, 1029
(“[T]he owners of these cars might never have bought them, and so these suits might never
have arisen, except for Ford’s contacts with their home States. Those contacts might turn any
resident of Montana or Minnesota into a Ford owner—even when he buys his car from out of
state. He may make that purchase because he saw ads for the car in local media.”); id. at 1033
(Alito, J., concurring) (“It is reasonable to infer that the vehicles in question here would never
have been on the roads in Minnesota and Montana if they were some totally unknown brand
that had never been advertised in those States.”). The majority and Justice Alito also said
that the existence of repair services in the state could play a role in the decision to buy a Ford.
Id. at 1029 (majority opinion) (“[A]ny resident of Montana or Minnesota ... [, in deciding to
purchase a Ford,] may [also] take into account a raft of Ford’s in-state activities designed to
make driving a Ford convenient there: that Ford dealers stand ready to service the car; that
other auto shops have ample supplies of Ford parts; and that Ford fosters an active resale
market for its old models.”); id. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is [also] reasonable to infer
that the vehicles in question here would never have been on the roads in Minnesota and
Montana if they ... would not be familiar to mechanics in those States ... and could not have
been easily repaired with parts available in those States.”).
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sufficiently “relate to” the claims. The low relatedness bar is
surpassed; the sliding scale theory is satisfied.
Now to the reasonableness factors. As discussed above, the forum
states were obviously interested in adjudicating the respective
cases. “[T]he plaintiffs are residents of the forum States. They used
the allegedly defective products in the forum States. And they
suffered injuries when those products malfunctioned in the forum
States.”188 All three of these facts trigger valid state interests.189
Like Bristol-Myers, any practical burden Ford—an international
company—would face litigating in the forum states is minimal.190
Conversely, it would have been burdensome for the plaintiffs to
have to travel to Ford’s “homes” (Michigan or Delaware) to bring
suit; it was obviously much more convenient for them to sue in the
forum states, the states where they reside and were injured.191 The
crucial evidence and witnesses that could attest to the alleged
malfunctions of the vehicles and the extent of the plaintiffs’ injuries were all in the forum states where, again, the accidents
occurred and the plaintiffs suffered their injuries.192 All these factors
tell us as well that bringing these suits in the forum states would
best vindicate “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies.”193
All five factors reiterate the Ford majority’s message: “th[e]
exercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable” in this case.194 Here, the
sliding scale theory is satisfied, and jurisdiction is reasonable. Thus,
the exercise of “relating to” jurisdiction over Ford is appropriate.
This Note’s approach returns results congruent with the Court’s
“relating to” jurisdiction precedents. The sliding scale may well have
been “loose and spurious” as applied by the California Supreme
Court in Bristol-Myers.195 However, based on the foregoing
188. Id. at 1031 (majority opinion).
189. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
190. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1029-30 (concluding that any burden on Ford “c[ould] ‘hardly
be said to be undue’” because Ford “conduct[s] so much business in Montana and Minnesota”
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))).
191. See id. at 1022, 1031 (“[E]ach of the plaintiffs brought suit in the most natural State
[to do so].”).
192. See id. at 1023.
193. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
194. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1030 (emphasis added).
195. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017).
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illustrations, this Note contends that employing the reasonableness
factors as the “real limits” to the sliding scale’s application sufficiently tightens and authenticates the sliding scale approach.196
III. THE SLIDING SCALE GOING FORWARD: APPLYING THIS NOTE’S
APPROACH TO THE NEXT QUESTIONS THE COURT MAY FACE
For all the “relating to” jurisdiction questions the Bristol-Myers
and Ford decisions answer, they pose just as many. Chief among
those: how should lower courts determine if “relating to” jurisdiction
is proper in the myriad of other categories of cases where there is
some relationship—but no causation—between a defendant’s forum
contacts and the plaintiff ’s cause of action?
This Section tries the revived sliding scale’s hand at two such
cases. The first case would be a very logical successor to Ford and
Bristol-Myers: a case where a plaintiff brings suit in their home
state after suffering injury away from home, in a different state.197
The second is a variation on Ford offered by the Ford majority
itself,198 a case where Ford still sold and marketed its cars in
Minnesota and Montana, but not the precise models involved in the
respective suits.199
A. Road Trip: Cases Where Plaintiffs Are Injured Away from
Home
In Bristol-Myers, the plaintiffs were nonresidents and injured
outside the forum, and jurisdiction was improper.200 In Ford, the
plaintiffs were residents and injured inside the forum, and jurisdiction was proper.201 This elicits the natural follow-up question,
which post-Ford literature has been quick to raise202: is jurisdiction
proper when the plaintiff is a resident but was injured outside the
forum?
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026.
See infra Part III.A.
See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028.
See infra Part III.B.
137 S. Ct. at 1782-84.
141 S. Ct. at 1031-32.
See, e.g., Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 21-24.
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To answer, consider a slight variation on Ford. Assume all the
facts remain the same as in Ford prime, except the Minnesota plaintiff drove his Ford into neighboring Iowa and was injured there. The
sliding scale inquiry, remaining the same as well, is satisfied.
The focus turns to reasonableness. Although the injury occurred
outside of the forum, two of the three state interests implicated in
Ford prime arise in this variation as well: there still is a Minnesota
resident plaintiff, and the car at issue was driven in Minnesota. To
be sure, Minnesota has an interest in making sure that defective
vehicles are not being driven on its roads, and Minnesota does not
relinquish that interest just because it was lucky enough that the
defect did not manifest within its borders.203 Ford is not burdened
by litigating in Minnesota.204 Conversely, the Minnesota plaintiff
would certainly have a much more difficult time litigating in Ford’s
home states.205 The crucial evidence is split across Minnesota and
Iowa. Witnesses and evidence in Minnesota are the best to testify to
the pre-accident status of both the car and the plaintiff. The
principal evidence and witnesses of the accident and defect in the
car would be in Iowa. Iowa would also have evidence and witnesses
to the plaintiff ’s injuries. If the plaintiff returned to Minnesota to
recover from his injuries, then there would be evidence there as
well. Allowing this case to be brought in Minnesota would also go
toward vindicating “the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.”206
As this is a case where the sliding scale theory is satisfied, the
only question is whether the factors show that “relating to” jurisdiction would be so unreasonable that they defeat jurisdiction on their
own.207 That clearly is not the case here. Though not as reasonable
as Ford prime, jurisdiction is still plenty reasonable in this variation. In fact, all five factors at least partially weigh in favor of
jurisdiction: the forum is interested in adjudicating the case, the
defendant will not be burdened by litigating in the forum, the
203. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1030.
204. See id. at 1026.
205. See id. at 1030.
206. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
207. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (outlining how the sliding scale and
reasonableness factors interact).
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plaintiff would be burdened by litigating elsewhere, the forum is
home to roughly half of the crucial evidence and witnesses, and, consequently, it would be efficient to resolve the case in Minnesota.208
This is a quite straightforward answer in the affirmative under
this Note’s reworked sliding scale. However, because of the farrago
of doctrine and methodology left behind by the Bristol-Myers and
Ford Courts, the scholarly conclusion is that courts “do not have
clear guidance” on how to confront “these very common fact patterns.”209 The administrability of this Note’s approach shines
through here.
B. The Road Not Travelled by the Ford Majority
The Ford majority asked readers to contrast a case “in which Ford
marketed the models [of cars driven by the plaintiffs] in only a
different State or region” from the actual facts in the case, but
explicitly “d[id] not address” such a hypothetical.210 It seems appropriate to see how this Note’s approach would address this
possibility.
First, the sliding scale inquiry. The quantity of Ford’s forum contacts changes ever so slightly in this variation. Because Ford no
longer sells or markets the models of cars involved in the suits in
the fora, the quantity of contacts necessarily decreases. But the
decrease is marginal; Ford’s forum contacts are still extensive.211
The copious contacts slide the case close to the general jurisdiction
end of the scale, and the requisite relatedness is correspondingly
lowered—just not quite as low as the relatedness demand was in
Ford prime.212
Changing more dramatically in this variation is the relatedness
between Ford’s contacts and the claims. There are no longer parallel
contacts here. Ford sells cars in the forum states but not the same
208. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
209. Borchers et al., supra note 30, at 23.
210. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028.
211. See id. at 1031 (“Ford has a veritable truckload of contacts with Montana and
Minnesota, as it admits.”); supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. In Minnesota, for
example, Ford loses in this hypothetical the roughly 2,000 1994 Crown Victoria cars it sold
to dealerships there but retains, among other contacts, the 200,000 vehicles of all kinds it sold
there from 2013 to 2015. See supra note 16.
212. See supra Part II.C.
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models sold in the other states that causally gave rise to the claims.
Although Ford’s sales of different models of cars in the fora still bear
some relationship to sales of different models in different states, the
relationship here is extremely flimsy.
However, Ford still advertises in the forum states and has its
certified repair services there. While Ford may not market the
specific models of cars involved in the suit, the purpose of these
contacts is to encourage the residents of those states to become Ford
drivers generally.213 Ford succeeded here, and these contacts had the
potential to play a “but-for” causal role in the injuries the plaintiffs
incurred.214
Ford’s forum contacts still “relate to” the claims in this variation,
but the relationship is weaker than it was in Ford prime. The lack
of parallel contacts makes this hypothetical a much closer case.
Without the parallel contacts—even with Ford’s ads and repair
services—it is difficult to conclusively say that the sliding scale theory is satisfied. Nor, however, could someone categorically conclude
that it is not satisfied, given how low the relatedness demand is in
response to the amplitude of Ford’s forum contacts. Here, the sliding
scale could go either way; this is an on-the-fence case. To break the
tie, this Note’s test turns to the reasonableness factors.
This variation is just as reasonable as Ford prime. The plaintiffs
are still residents of the forum states, drove the defective cars in the
forum states, and suffered their injuries in the forum states.215 The
rest of the reasonableness factors follow from there.216 Like it was
in Ford prime, the “exercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable” here.217
The factors accordingly tip the scale in favor of finding jurisdiction,
so “relating to” jurisdiction over Ford would be appropriate in this
hypothetical.218

213. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1028 (“[B]y making it easier to own a Ford, [Ford] encourage[s]
Montanans and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.”); id. at 1033 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (“The whole point of [Ford’s forum] activities was to put more Fords (including
those in question here) on Minnesota and Montana roads.”).
214. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
215. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1031.
216. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text for further articulation of the
remaining reasonableness factors.
217. Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1030 (emphasis added).
218. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The Ford Court reached the correct outcome, and its decision
marks a momentous shift in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction.
That decision, however, leaves behind not only the shiny new “relating to” jurisdiction for scholars to examine, but also a methodological mess through which the lower courts must sort.
A sliding scale approach to contacts and relatedness, coupled with
a separate consideration of the reasonableness factors as the sliding
scale’s “real limits,” is the best way to govern this new “relating to”
era of the Court’s jurisprudence. It gives lower courts a workable
analytical framework to follow and ensures that considerations of
relatedness and reasonableness—which do separate work—are
properly analyzed independently of one another. Most importantly,
this approach yields results consistent with Court precedent,219
ensuring that the exercise of “relating to” specific personal jurisdiction will lie only when it conforms to “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.”220
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219. See supra Part II.B-C.
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